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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze local government units’ borrowing in Croatia. 
Throughout the paper, we present the financial positions of local government units accor-
ding to the size and structure of their gross and net debts, analyze borrowing conditions 
with commercial banks and the state development bank and discuss potential opportunities 
for and constraints on the issue of municipal bonds. Croatian local government units are 
not overindebted but do use guarantees to avoid central government borrowing restricti-
ons. Sources of potential financial instability and risks to the creditworthiness of local go-
vernment units can be found in the financial operations of utility companies. Inaugurating 
a credit rating system would improve control of adherence to budgetary constraints and 
determination of priorities for approving local government units’ borrowing.
Keywords: local government units, LGU borrowing, LGU debt, LGU credit  wort  h-
iness
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze local government unit (LGU) borrowing in the last decade, 
with a special emphasis on the financial position of local government units according to 
the size and structure of their gross and net debt. Borrowing conditions with commercial 
banks and the state development bank are analyzed in detail, and potential opportunities 
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for and constraints on issuing municipal bonds are discussed separately. The main hypot-
hesis of the paper is that Croatian local government units are not overindebted but use gu-
arantees to avoid central government borrowing restriction. In order to determine whether 
local government units are overindebted, the structure of their net debt is analyzed. We 
conclude with final recommendations for improving LGU borrowing in Croatia. 
2 Financial position of local government units
Since 2000 the financial position of local government units has been improving. The 
reasons for this are numerous, but one of the main causes is the beginning of the process of 
fiscal decentralization in 2001. As a result of decentralization, the authority for managing 
basic local government functions was devolved to local governments, in conjunction with 
the provision of allowances for their financing from the central government budget. The 
majority of local government units benefited from the opportunity to introduce surtax 
and from the increased share in personal income tax inaugurated by modifications of 
legislation. 
In the period from 2002 to 2009 alone, local government budgets increased from 12 
to more than 25 billion kuna. As a consequence, the financial situation of local gover-
nment units improved, i.e. local government budgets stabilized (balanced), even recor-
ding a surpluses.
Figure 1: Local government unit budget from 2002 to 2009 (in billion kuna)
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Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia, 2010.
The financial position of local government units until 2009 is stable. This can be 
observed through various budgetary surplus/deficit measures. LGUs do not have significant 
liquidity problems. Current revenue is more than enough to cover current expenditure 
causing current and primary surpluses in LGU budgets. A deficit in non-financial assets is 
visible throughout the observed period as a result of an increasing growth of expenditure 381
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for capital financing. Until 2009 LGU budget was generally balanced. Only in 2009 did 
the total budget deficit increase to 0.6% of GDP as a consequence of the global financial 
crisis. 
Table 1:   Measures of local government unit budget deficit from 2002 to 2009 (in 
billion kuna, and as % of GDP)
Current Primary Nonfinancial assets Total
 
billion 
kuna
% of 
GDP
billion 
kuna
% of 
GDP
billion 
kuna
% of 
GDP
billion 
kuna
% of 
GDP
2002 2.5 1.2 2.6 1.2 -1.7 -0.8 0.7 0.3
2003 2.9 1.3 3.0 1.3 -2.8 -1.2 0.1 0.0
2004 3.1 1.3 3.2 1.3 -3.2 -1.3 -0.1 -0.1
2005 3.2 1.2 3.3 1.3 -3.6 -1.3 -0.3 -0.1
2006 4.3 1.5 4.4 1.5 -4.3 -1.5 0.0 0.0
2007 5.4 1.7 5.5 1.7 -4.8 -1.5 0.5 0.2
2008 4.8 1.4 4.9 1.4 -5.0 -1.5 -0.3 -0.1
2009 3.0 0.9 3.2 1.0 -5.0 -1.5 -1.9 -0.6
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia, 2010.
Up to 2009 the number of local government units fulfilling the main borrowing 
criteria increased (meaning that their current revenue exceeds current expenditure, i.e. 
their operating revenue exceeds their operating expenditure1). For example, in 2003 around 
85% of local government units met the main borrowing criteria. Therefore, in the following 
parts of this paper, we present the key attributes of local government borrowing criteria 
as well as those for the institutions and utility companies they own. 
Tax revenue dominated in the structure of aggregate LGU revenue. Financing of 
LGUs strongly relies on income tax revenue sharing. Tax revenue (mostly income tax) 
represents from 59 to 65% of total current revenue. The second most important source 
of LGU financing consists of administrative fees and user charges (mostly municipal 
economy fees and contributions), with a significant share of around 20% in total current 
revenue. The share of property income ranges from 7 to 9%, of grants from 6 to 12%, 
whereas other sources of current revenue amount to a negligible share, of 1%. Figure 2 
presents a detailed sketch of the current revenue composition of local government units 
from 2002 to 2009.
1 Following items are excluded from operating revenue: domestic and foreign subsidies, grants and transfers from 
government budget, other LGU budgets and special contracts (local levies and citizen cofinancing).382
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Figure 2: Structure of local government unit current revenue 2002-2009 (in billion kuna)
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia, 2009.
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3 Key attributes of local government borrowing 
The Budget Law2 regulates the borrowing of local units and the giving of guarantees. 
In the annual execution of the central government budget laws, central government de-
termines the budgetary restrictions in the borrowing of local units and the giving of gua-
rantees for the borrowings of their extra-budgetary spending agencies, that is, institutions 
and companies in the majority ownership of the local units. Most legal provisions that re-
late to borrowing and central government debt management are also applied to local units. 
There are some exceptions, for the government regulates in detail the borrowing of local 
units by additional sets of regulations and the provisions of other laws.
Local units may take on short-term and long-term loans.
Short-term borrowing of local units is possible for the funding of the regular activi-
ties of their bodies and their budgetary spending agencies, but only for occasions when 
the revenue is not collected evenly throughout the year. However, the Government does 
not approve local unit budgetary borrowing for current illiquidity or for deficit financing, 
that is, for overdrafts in the budget current account. For this reason a decision concerning 
short-term borrowing is based on the estimate of LGU ability to secure the repayment of 
principal and interest on a short-term loan throughout the year while properly meeting its 
current liabilities.
Long-term borrowing of local units is conducted by taking out loans on the domestic 
money and capital markets, and from contractors only for capital investment projects for 
reconstruction and development that are funded out of the local budget. Local units can 
borrow pursuant to a decision of the representative body with the prior consent of the Go-
vernment. In 2003 the provision about getting into debt to contractors was abolished, and 
so local units may now borrow only via loans and bonds.
2 In Croatian Zakon o proračunu.383
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The Government gives guarantees in order to provide protection in case a local unit 
cannot repay its debt. If the local unit cannot repay the principal and the interest, the go-
vernment takes on the obligation to repay the debt, which it will finance out of the reve-
nues of the central government budget. For this reason, before taking on debt, the local 
units must receive the guarantee of the Government.
In 2002, for the first time, the Ministry of Finance adopted its Instruction3, and in 
2004 and 2009 the Regulations concerning the procedure for local unit borrowing and 
the giving of guarantees4. The Government and Ministry of Finance have also laid down 
clearer borrowing criteria, and regulations for the implementation of the financing of 
capital investment projects. Capital projects or capital investments are expenditures for 
the procurement of non-financial assets that local units fund out of their own budgets. 
The investment has to be planned in the local budget for the budgetary year for which 
the borrowing consent is sought, and has to be stated in the decision on the execution of 
the local budget. 
An application for consent to borrowing and for the Ministry of Finance to provide 
a guarantee (which is submitted to the ministry’s department for the preparation of the 
budgets of local and regional self-government) must be submitted by the head of the local 
unit (head of a municipality, mayor or county prefect). According to the Budget Law 
(Article 87), a local government unit is obliged to inform the Ministry of Finance about 
the contracted loan within 8 days of the contraction. In addition to that, a local government 
unit has to inform Ministry of Finance within a fiscal year, every quarter (until 10th in 
the month) for a previous period about the repayment of a loan it has gained Government 
approval for. 
Since some LGUs issue guarantees without the approval of the Ministry of Finance 
and borrow beyond their financial limits, one of the key areas of the Ministry of Finance’s 
Budget Supervision Directorate is the review of LGU borrowing activities. Unluckily, 
there is little information in Croatia about operations of the utility firms and the amount 
and structure of their assets and liabilities. Without systematic information the borrowing 
of the utility firms will continue to be decided on by the heads of the local government 
units, without any serious prior evaluation of the state of the assets and the manner in 
which the servicing will be carried out from the budgets of the local government units. 
Clearly, borrowings for the financing of capital projects through utility companies have 
become a resource for circumventing the Government’s budgetary restriction. Until 2008 
local government units gave guarantees not only to utility companies but even to private 
firms and associations. In addition to that, they authorised guarantees for loans to finan-
ce current cash flow problems, and sometimes without having had the decision of the re-
presentative assembly. Such procedures increased the credit risk and had a direct effect 
on the increase of the total debt of local government units and the imposition of additio-
nal fiscal burdens on citizens. In some cases local government mayors ignored the rules 
3 In Croatian Naputak o postupku zaduživanja i davanja jamstva jedinica lokalne i područne (regionale) 
samouprave.
4 In Croatian Pravilnik o postupku zaduživanja jedinica lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave i davanju 
jamstva jedinica područne (regionalne) samouprave.384
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because they had absolute authority within their local government units and councils see-
med to be too weak to put them under control. For example, from 2005 to 2008 as many 
as17 LGUs borrowed without government approval, blatantly ignoring the rules without 
incurring any consequences. Formally, the Ministry of Finance might cut the level of grant 
(or income tax revenue share) provided by the amount the LGU borrowed without for-
mal government approval. There are loopholes which allow municipal utility companies 
borrowing beyond the municipal constraints, while the municipality can issue guarantees to 
support that same borrowing. Unfortunately, although the Budget Law prescribes penalti-
es for such behaviour, local government units used to take advantage of these loopholes. 
3.1 Budgetary restrictions in the borrowing of local units
Assuming the prior consent of the Government, only local units the operational re-
venues of which made in the year proceeding the year in which the unit takes on debt are 
larger than its expenditures can borrow funds. From 1996 to 1998, local units took on debt 
on the domestic and foreign capital markets up to 30% of their budgetary expenditures 
made, that is, the total annual liability of debt was not allowed to exceed 30% of the bud-
getary expenditures from the preceding year. From 1998 to 2009 the Ministry of Finance 
and the Government set a lower borrowing limit, and the total annual liabilities (i.e., the 
yearly annuity) of a local unit were not allowed to exceed 20% of the budgetary revenues 
collected in the previous year. These budget restrictions are grounded on ad hoc estimati-
ons based on local government borrowing requirements from the previous period. 
There is a need to ensure that the borrowing of all government levels within general 
government (i.e., state, extra-budgetary funds and local government) is allocated effici-
ently and fairly and that internal debt rules for general government are complied with. It 
is equally important to establish a mechanism for disseminating borrowing permits across 
different entities at each level of government. Unfortunately, by setting the rules for LGU 
borrowing, the Government and the Ministry of Finance did not take into account indivi-
dual local government borrowing requirements. Existing associations of cities, municipa-
lities and counties are weak institutions with limited capacity for influencing Government 
and Ministry of Finance and suggesting new borrowing limits for LGU. 
From 2003 to 2007, the Government and the Finance Ministry brought in additional 
restrictions. And so in 2003 and 2004 local units could contract debt by at most up to 3% 
of the total operating revenues, and from 2004 to 2007 up to 2%, and from 2007 up to 
2.3% of total collected operating revenues of all the local units. In 2010, local units to 
which the Government had given its consent for their borrowing up to December, which 
consent was not used, and local units in areas of special national concern, were exempted 
from the overall budgetary restriction (they cannot borrow). Nor can local units that receive 
credit lines for the procurement of non-financial assets from the Regional Development 
Fund of the Republic of Croatia borrow either, or local units that are co-financing capital 
investment projects from the EU pre-accession programmes. 
In case of non-compliance with the legal framework (violation of borrowing limits, 
issuing guarantees without Ministry of Finance’s approval, borrowing for current expen-
diture funding, etc.) the Budget Law provides sanctions ranging from 500 thousand to 385
A. Bajo and M. Primorac: Local government borrowing practice in Croatia
Financial Theory and Practice 34 (4) 379-406 (2010)
2 million kuna for the legal entity, 10 to 100 thousand kuna for the responsible person 
(budgetary user), 50 to 100 thousand kuna for the responsible person (extrabudgetary 
user) and 50 to 100 thousand kuna for the responsible person (public partner). Unfortu-
nately, these sanctions have not actually been imposed on local government units that fa-
iled to comply.
In addition to the above mentioned legislation, secondary legislation in form of a bylaw 
on LGU borrowing and issuing guarantees is implemented in order to ensure compliance 
with the provisions of the primary legislation. The bylaw on LGU borrowing and issuing 
guarantees prescribes arrangements, conditions and obligatory parts of an application for 
getting the approval for LGU borrowing and issuing guarantees, as well as an approach 
for reporting on borrowing and issuing guarantees.5 
The enactment of separate public debt legislation (act) that would prescribe both state 
and local government borrowing, as well as the borrowing of utility enterprises would offer 
greater flexibility and improve the efficiency of current institutional framework. Often there 
is a reluctance to re-open budget legislation for fear that legislators will use the opportunity 
to table other amendments in unrelated areas which may disincentivize governments from 
tabling needed amendments to public debt related provisions. Additionally, it may be easier 
to include more detail on specified borrowing purposes, the objectives of public debt and 
the requirements to develop and implement borrowing strategies through the enactment 
of separate legislation.
3.2 Extra-budgetary funds and local government owned enterprises
Total direct debt of utility enterprises does not count in terms of budgetary restrictions 
for LGU borrowing, although the financial operations of utility enterprises and their LGU 
are intertwined. However, adherence to formal budgetary restrictions for LGU borrowing 
can be jeopardized because of the lack of data on existing debt and obligations of utility 
enterprises, as well as on their financial operations, size and structure of their assets and 
liabilities, even on their number and sectoral distribution. Until 2009, LGUs bypassed 
budgetary restrictions by capital financing through utility enterprises debt growth (see the 
box on the City of Zagreb in chapter 5). Information on the size and the structure of local 
government unit-owned utility companies is still unavailable. Such information would 
provide a fuller picture of the implicit local government debt and its structure. 
Guarantees and approvals for extrabudgetary funds’ borrowing influence LGU 
liabilities in terms of budgetary restrictions. Unfortunately, the definition of extrabudgetary 
user is pretty narrow. According to the extrabudgetary users’ registry, extrabudgetary users 
are only county roads authorities. Other potential generators of total LGU debt, such as 
utility enterprises do not have a status of extrabudgetary users. 
Funds from local government budgets are often transferred through subsidies and in-
directly through guarantees to utility enterprises. Subsidies and capital grants from local 
government to utility enterprises increased from 691 million kuna in 2002 to more than 
1.6 billion kuna in 2009.
5 Provisions of this bylaw refer to LGU credit borrowing, issuing guarantees and issuing municipal bonds.386
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3.3 Borrowing conditions
Gross debt consists of accumulated local government units’ obligations at the end of 
the period. It can also be defined as the sum of budget deficits of local government units 
and their budgetary and extrabudgetary users. Total local government sector gross debt 
increased from 1.45 billion kuna in 2002 to 2.2 billion kuna in 2009. It should be empha-
sized that the size of total local government debt does not include total local government-
owned utility companies’ debt. 
Figure 3:   Total debt and annual borrowing of local government from 2002 to 2009 (in 
billion kuna)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
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Source: Ministry of Finance and Croatian National Bank, 2010.
Local government units raise loans predominantly on the domestic capital market with 
varying borrowing dynamics. From a historical perspective, the biggest portion of LGU 
debt came into being in 1998, when central government approved borrowing worth 1.3 
billion kuna. Since 1998 LGUs have on average borrowed 400 million kuna a year.
From 1997 to 2009 local government units used all possible debt instruments, inclu-
ding municipal bonds, loans and even getting into debt with contractors (for works). Some 
LGUs entered into short term debt as well. The Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (CBRD) is a state financial “player” that ensures favourable loans (with lower 
interest rates) for LGU capital project financing. From 1997 to 2006 the borrowing con-
ditions of local government units improved, narrowing the gap between minimum and 
maximum interest rates of different maturities. 
From 1997 to 2000 there were quite big differences between minimum and maximum 
interest rates. In the middle run, interest rates were between 2 and 4%, sometimes reac-
hing as much as 14 to 16%. Big spreads between short term and long term interest rates 
emerged as a consequence of an unfledged capital market and a weak banking system. 
The fact that the interest rate on local government short term borrowing reached on ave-387
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rage 14% is definitely worth mentioning. Since 2000 the average interest rate and diffe-
rences between interest rates for various maturities of local government units’ borrowing 
have decreased due to the increased competition among banks on the capital market. In 
2004 and 2005 the smallest difference between interest rates on local government unit 
borrowing amounted on average to about 4.2%. From 2003 local government units start 
taking out long term debts (over 10 years). After a while, from 2006, interest rates on local 
government unit borrowing increased again, exceeding the level of 6%. 
Figure 4:   Average weighted interest rates for local government units’ borrowing from 
1997 to 2008 (in %)
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia, 2009.
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The reduction in pre-crisis interest rates was not largely due to a general downward 
trend in international and domestic interest rates and a flattening of the yield curve as 
expectations of future inflation reduced.
3.3.1 Loans with commercial banks
Some years ago, local government units took on short term debts at unfavourable in-
terest rates, from 16.6% in 1997 to 11.5% in 2000. In the years 2001 and 2002 LGUs did 
not make short term borrowings, whereas from 2003 a significant decrease in interest rates 
can be observed. Interest rates for mid term and long term loans to LGUs decreased until 
2008, when they started increasing again. From 2001 commercial banks pegged interest 
rates for local government units’ loans to reference interest rates on the domestic or fore-
ign capital market (i.e., LIBOR, EURIBOR, ZIBOR, Ministry of Finance treasury bills 
with up to 180 days maturity), which increases the interest rate risk because of variable 
borrowing conditions in financial markets. 
Box 1: LIBOR, EURIBOR, ZIBOR
EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offered Rate) is the interest rate at which interbank deposits 
within the euro zone are offered by one prime bank to another within the EMU zone. EURI-388
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BOR is sponsored by the European Banking Federation. EURIBOR depends on the “base” 
rate provided by the European Central Bank. An increase or decrease of EURIBOR depends 
on economic conditions in the EU. When it needs to control inflation or strengthen the euro, 
ECB increases its interest rate, causing an increase of EURIBOR, whereas in a situation in 
which the economy stagnates, the interest rate decreases, causing a decrease of EURIBOR. 
[http://www.euribor.org/] 
LIBOR (London InterBank Offered Rate) serves as a standard or reference interest rate for 
short term borrowings. It is calculated daily by the British Banker Association. Calculation is 
based on interest rates offered in the London money market (or interbank market). LIBOR is 
used as a reference interest rate for other financial instruments, especially those denominated 
in USD. Just like EURIBOR, variations in LIBOR can affect debt repayment both in a favou-
rable and an unfavourable way. [http://www.bba.org.uk/]
ZIBOR (Zagreb Interbank Offered Rate) is the interest rate in the Croatian interbank mar-
ket, published by the Croatian Banking Association (http://www.hub.hr). Official calculation of 
ZIBOR is based on a calculation of the average interest rates of the eight biggest commercial 
banks in Croatia, quoted every day at 11 o’clock by Reuters. The Croatian Banking Associati-
on publishes ZIBOR rates every working day at 11:30 on http://www.reuters.hr.
Table 2:   Average interest rates for local government unit borrowing with commercial 
banks and the CBRD, from 1997 to 2008 (in %)
Year Short term 2-5 years 5-10 years More than 10 years
CBRD Banks CBRD Banks CBRD Banks CBRD Banks
1997  16.67 7.00 10.12 5.50 7.76    
1998  13.21 9.50 10.24 6.00 7.32 6.75 12.00
1999   12.49 7.00 11.45 7.02 6.87 8.50   7.62
2000   11.50  10.30   9.17      8.00
2001         8.72 6.00 7.95 7.33   7.00
2002     6.00   6.51 6.50 6.07 6.00   5.00
2003     7.20 3.98   5.72   4.60 3.61   7.50
2004     6.00     3.79   5.01 4.30   4.18
2005    2.30      5.00  
2006         4.84 2.00 3.79 2.00   3.70
2007     6.00   4.62 4.00 5.24 2.24   4.92
2008         6.85 4.00 7.04 3.10   6.61
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia, 2009; Croatian Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (CBRD) loans.
The CBRD ensures favourable borrowing conditions, so called soft loans, which are 
much more attractive than the usual conditions local government units can obtain from 
commercial banks. Despite that, CBRD interest rates, in some periods, do not diverge a 
lot from commercial interest rates and are sometimes even higher. Nevertheless, local 
government unit borrowings with CBRD have a fixed interest rate which eliminates in-389
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terest rate risk. CBRD is the only institution that pegs interest rates to the Croatian Nati-
onal Bank discount rate. Since 2001 the Regional Development Fund of the Republic of 
Croatia6 has made some of its loans available through CBRD, which frequently approves 
loans with a 1 to 3 year grace period. 
3.3.2 Municipal bonds
Issuing municipal bonds represents the easiest way to tap a pool of investors outside 
of the banking sector. In general, municipal bonds should be the most transparent, but 
also the most efficient way of local government borrowing. By issuing bonds, local 
government units get immediate access to the private capital market. Nevertheless, the 
use of this mechanism of borrowing makes it harder for central government to monitor 
and control loan supply for local government units (Peterson, 2000). Besides that, local 
government debt becomes more available to interested parties, because by purchasing 
only a part of the debt, potential investors can meet their constraints in terms of total 
permitted exposure to certain investments (especially commercial banks). A need for 
publicly available information on local government units’ operations, as well as their 
participation in capital markets, would definitely contribute importantly to the ability of 
LGUs to issue municipal bonds. 
Increased activity in terms of the issue of municipal bonds would shed more light 
on local government units’ credit rating, which would help identify failures connected 
to local government operations. Once identified, factors negatively influencing a local 
government unit’s credit rating could be eliminated or approached with additional care. 
Efficient and transparent LGU credit rating (publicly available comparative information on 
LGU operations), would benefit the best local government units, whereas underperformers 
would be motivated to undertake positive changes. In this way it would be possible to 
foster positive competition between local government units, indirectly increasing efficiency 
of the entire local government sector. 
Demand for local government bonds is provided mainly by financial institutions 
(investment funds, commercial banks, social security funds and insurance companies). 
According to the current legislative framework, insurance companies have to invest 
at least 50% of their assets in securities issued by the Republic of Croatia, Croatian 
National Bank, Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or bonds and other 
debt instruments issued with government guarantees (which include local government 
bonds). In terms of social security funds, according to the regulation in force, they are 
allowed to have up to 30% of assets invested in bonds and other debt instruments issued 
by local government. Increased activities directed to local government bond issuing would 
help potential investors diversify their portfolios and foster further development of the 
financial market. 
6 Regional Development Fund of the Republic of Croatia (NN 107/2001) is established for fostering balanced 
regional development of areas under special state care, islands, hill and mountain areas, especially those whose gross 
domestic product is below 65% of average GDP in Croatia. Fund raises its funds from privatisation, state budget, 
bonds, loans, donations and other sources. 390
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In order to examine the potential of the local government bonds investor base, some 
data on social security funds are presented below. Net assets of social security funds incre-
ased from 2 billion kuna in 2002 to 29 billion kuna in 2009. Although the share of obliga-
tory social security funds’ assets has been decreasing over time, in 2009 it still represents 
more than 95% of total social security funds’ assets. Annual growth rate of obligatory so-
cial security funds’ assets decreased from 129.63% in 2003 to 7.57 in 2008. In the period 
from 2002 to 2009, 86-94% of obligatory social security funds’ total assets were repre-
sented by domestic securities and deposits which include shares and GDRs, government 
bonds, municipal bonds, corporate bonds, closed-end funds, open-end funds, short-term 
securities and deposits. In the observed period (2002-2009), the value of total domestic se-
curities and deposits rose from 1.65 billion kuna in 2002 to 16.72 billion kuna in 2009. 
Figure 5:   The structure of domestic securities and assets of obligatory social security 
funds from 2002-2009 (in billion kuna – left scale, and as % of total assets 
– right scale) 
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Source: Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, 2010.
In the structure of total domestic securities and deposits, government bonds have a pre-
dominant share (64-88%). High exposure to government bonds is mainly caused by a low 
supply of other low-risk debt instruments on the market. From 2002 to 2009, the share of 
municipal bonds in the structure of domestic securities and deposits was constantly below 
1%. Raising local government debt through issuing municipal bonds with varying charac-
teristics (in terms of maturities, interest rate composition, etc.) would broaden the pool of 
adequate securities for social security funds and other similar investors additionally en-
hancing their opportunities for risk, liquidity and asset liability management. 
Until 2009 only eight local government units with stabile fiscal capacities issued 
municipal bonds, mainly for infrastructural financing and liquidating dues towards con-
tractors (see table 3). The first bonds, issued by Istarska County in 1995, were traded on 
the secondary market, representing the very first bonds of that kind traded on the Zagreb 
Stock Exchange. The second issue of Istarska County’s bonds and the first issue of the 
city of Opatija’s bonds were issued as a private placement. With its first eco-bond issue, 391
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as it was called, Istarska County solved the problem of waste water and the project was 
partially financed by a World Bank loan. The second issue, of health bonds, was issued 
for settling the dues of a hospital in Pula. The cities of Opatija, Koprivnica, Zadar, Rije-
ka, Split, Osijek and Vinkovci have issued municipal bonds for infrastructural financing 
(swimming pools, schools, roads, sports halls, etc.).
Table 3: Local government bonds from 1995 to 2009
Issuer Issued Mature
Currency (millions) Interest, 
(%)
Interest 
repayment
Principal 
repayment kuna euro DEM
Istarska County 1995
2.5 
years
2.0 11
Istarska County 1996 1998 4.3 4.0
Istarska County 1996 1999 5.7 7
City of Opatija 1998 2002 14.0 8.5
City of Koprivnica 2004 2011 60   6.5 Semi annual Semi annual
City of Zadar 2004 2011   18.5 5.5 Semi annual At maturity
City of Rijeka 2006 2016   24.6 4.125 Semi annual Amort.
City of Split 2006 2013   8 4.5625 Semi annual 2 instalments
City of Split 2007 2015   8.1 4.75 Semi annual 2 instalments
City of Osijek 2007 2017 25   5.5 Semi annual Amort.
City of Vinkovci 2007 2017 42   5.5 Semi annual Amort.
City of Split 2008 2017   8.2 6.0 Semi annual 2 instalments
Source: Zagreb Stock Exchange, 2010.
Municipal bonds have a higher risk premium than government bonds. For example, 
the nominal interest rate on the municipal bonds issued by Vinkovci and Osijek in 2007 
in kuna is 16% higher than that on government bonds with the same maturity issued in 
the same year. The fact is that out of six municipal bond issues (Zadar, Split, Rijeka, Osi-
jek, Vinkovci, and Koprivnica) the municipal bonds of Split, Osijek, and Vinkovci are 
not traded at all on the Zagreb Stock Exchange, and that with just three issues (municipal 
bonds of Zadar, Rijeka and Koprivnica) trading does exist, but rarely and sporadically. 
It is apparent that investors hold municipal bonds to maturity. One of the questions that 
emerges is why local government bonds are issued for trading in the market, when other 
sales techniques like private placement might be more appropriate.
3.4 Summary of local government unit borrowing
The biggest users of commercial bank and CBRD loans are municipalities and cities. 
From 2005 to 2008 banks lent 2 billion kuna to local government units. Weighted avera-
ge interest rates in 2008 increased to 5.84%.392
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Table 4: Characteristics of local government loans from 2005 to 2008
  2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Number of loans: 34 45 41 32 152
Counties 34331 3
Cities 14 24 17 21 76
Municipalities 17 17 21 8 63
Realized loans, in million kuna 367 652 430 524 1,974
Stipulated loans, in million kuna 368 653 451 541 2,012
Average interest rate, in % 4.48 4.73 4.79 5.84 –
Average amortization period (years) 10.7  8.1 9.0 8.6 9.0
Average grace period (years) 1.1 1.0 1.6 1.3 1.2
Number of loans without Government approval  37431 7
Number of loans with Government approval   31 38 37 29 135
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia, 2009.
Some local government borrowing was approved with a grace period of more than a 
year. The majority of local government units raised debt with the provisional approval of 
central government and the Ministry of Finance. Nevertheless, from 2005 to 2008 year 
17 local government units deliberately violated the provisions of the Budget Law and 
contracted debts without prior approval.
3.4.1 Debt owners
Major individual local government debt owners (creditors) are the CBRD and the four 
largest commercial banks. Only 21% of the debt is represented by municipal bonds in the 
possession of commercial banks and mandatory pension funds. 
Figure 6: Structure of local government units’ creditors in %; June 30, 2009
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia, 2009.
Zagrebačka banka
29%
CBRD
7%
Privredna banka Zagreb
12% Erste Bank
9%
Raiffeisenbank
3%
Slavonska banka
6%
Hypo Alpe-Adria
Bank
1%
Capital market – 
LGU bonds
 21%
Croatian 
Postal Bank
2%
Other
10%393
A. Bajo and M. Primorac: Local government borrowing practice in Croatia
Financial Theory and Practice 34 (4) 379-406 (2010)
4 Local government gross debt
Total local government unit debt is a sum of all accumulated obligations: loans, issu-
ed guarantees for public utility companies’ borrowings and arrears. Direct debt is repre-
sented by contractual obligations of local government units for interest and principal re-
payment. Local government direct debt has increased since 2002, reaching an amount 
of slightly less than 2 billion kuna in 2009. The debt structure is dominated by domestic 
loans, foreign debt taking a negligible share. 
Table 5: Direct local government units’ debt from 2002 to 2009 (million kuna and % GDP)
Year Value
Foreign 
debt
Foreign debt 
(as a % of total 
local debt) 
Domestic 
debt
Domestic debt 
(as a % of total 
local debt)
Total
2002 
million kuna 223
15
1,235
85
1,458
% GDP 0 0.6 0.70
2003
million kuna 349
23
1,137
77
1,486
% GDP 0 0.5 0.7
2004
million kuna 263
16
1,420
84
1,682
% GDP 0 0.6 0.7
2005
million kuna 199
13
1,327
87
1,526
% GDP 0 0.5 0.6
2006
million kuna 166
12
1,164
88
1,330
% GDP 0 0.4 0,5
2007
million kuna 48
3
1,572
97
1,619
% GDP 0 0.5 0.5
2008
million kuna 27
1
1,863
99
1,890
% GDP 0 0.5 0.6
2009
million kuna 9
1
2,067
99
2,076
% GDP 0 0,6 0,6
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia, 2010.
The share of debt in GDP might be helpful for getting a bigger picture of LGU 
debt and its impact on central government debt. Local government debt in 2009 reached
0.58 % of GDP. Foreign direct debt gradually decreased from 223 million kuna in 2002 to 
as little as 18 million kuna in 2009. The main reason for the increase in total direct debt 
was an increase in domestic debt which in 2009 amounted to 99% of total direct debt.
4.1 Guarantees for extrabudgetary user and utility company borrowings
Guarantees for utility companies’ borrowings represent potential liabilities for local 
government units, because LGUs, with their own revenues, guarantee debt repayment in 
the case of a default by the original debtor. Accordingly, guarantees have to be included in 
local government debt. Since 2005, LGUs have had to keep specific records of guarantees 394
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issued and also to form guarantee reserves in their budget in case the guarantees fall due. 
Despite that, it is still unknown how much of their resources local government units assign 
for budgetary reserves or how much would they have to assign for guarantee reserves. 
Table 6: Number of local government units issued guarantees
Counties Municipalities Cities City of Zagreb Total
2005   2     4     6     12
2006   5     3   14     22
2007   5     9  13 1   28
2008   4     5     9 1   19
2009   3     6     7     16
2005-2009 19   27   49 2   97
Total no of LGU 20 429 126   575
Source: Local government units’ financial statements, 2010.
From 2005 to 2009, 97 (out of a total of 575) local government units issued guarantees 
for utility companies’ borrowings. In spite of a relatively low number of issuers, the sum of 
all active guarantees increased from 0.5 billion kuna in 2005 to 2.6 billion kuna in 2009. 
Table 7:   Active and issued local government units’ guarantees from 2005 to 2009
(in billion kuna)
 
Active guarantees, 
Jan 1
Guarantees issued 
in current year
Active guarantees, 
Dec 31
2005
City of Zagreb      
Other LGU 0.5 0.1 0.5
City of Zagreb      
Total 0.5 0.1 0.5
2006
City of Zagreb      
Other LGU 1.5 0.2 1.5
Total 1.5 0.2 1.5
2007
City of Zagreb 1.1 0.2 1.4
Other LGU 1.5 0.2 1.5
Total 2.6 0.4 2.8
2008
City of Zagreb 1.4 0.2 1.5
Other LGU 1.6 0.5 1.8
Total 2.9 0.6 3.3
2009
City of Zagreb 1.5 0.0 1.2
Other LGU 1.4 0.1 1.4
Total 3.0 0.1 2.6
Source: Local government units’   financial statements, 2010.395
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The cumulative value of local government unit guarantees has to be interpreted with 
caution. The reason for this is the extremely big share of the city of Zagreb7. 
Issued, active and called guarantees
Issued guarantees – guarantees for extrabudgetary users’ borrowings throughout a year.
Active guarantees – total value of issued (not matured) guarantees (both from current and 
previous years) on certain date (end of period). 
Called guarantees – guarantees presented for payment to the local government unit that 
issued guarantee for the loan, because the extrabudgetary user can not meet its obligations.
4.2 Local government unit arrears
Local government unit arrears count as a form of debt in terms of local government 
units’ borrowing criteria and need to be discussed further. Arrears do not represent a 
classical debt category if debt obligations are met throughout a year. In general, an 
obligation exists if a transaction or event that initiates a responsibility for paying occurs and 
is not liquidated in time. If a liability is not liquidated after the payment date, the obligation 
is considered due (Bajo, 2007). Because of a paying system that does not encourage local 
government units (utility companies) to meet their obligations to contractors on time, local 
government units should consider those arrears as a debt category. An overview of LGU 
arrears is given in table 8. 
Table 8: Local government units’ arrears from 2005 to 2008 (in million kuna)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Local government units’ arrears 1,692 1,748 2,013 2,193 2,443
Source: Local government units’ financial statements, 2010.
From 2005, local government unit arrears increased from 1.6 billion to 2.4 billion 
kuna in 2009. 
Total gross local government debt is the sum of all accumulated liabilities for loans 
and issued guarantees (for utility companies’ borrowings) and arrears. Due to the expanded 
scope of local government liabilities, which now include not just direct loans, but also 
potential liabilities (guarantees) and arrears, local government debt significantly increased 
in 2005 thanks to an increase in guarantees and arrears. The potential liabilities of utility 
companies reveal a completely different perspective on the nature and structure of local 
government debt. 
7 In 2008 the city of Zagreb’s guarantees amounted 1.9 billion kuna, mainly due to guarantees approved for 
borrowings of the Zagrebacki Holding.396
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Table 9:   The size and the structure of local government units’ debt from 1997 to 2009 
(in billion kuna)
Loans Guarantees Arrears Total
billion 
kuna
% of 
GDP
billion 
kuna
% of 
GDP
billion 
kuna
% of 
GDP
billion 
kuna
% of 
GDP
1997 0.3 0.2    0.3 0.2
1998 0.7 0.5    0.7 0.5
1999 1.3 0.9    1.3 0.9
2000 1.6 0.6  1.6 0.6
2001 1.8 0.7  1.8 0.7
2002 1.9 0.7  1.9 0.7
2003 2.0 0.8  2.0 0.8
2004 1.8 0.7  1.8 0.7
2005 1.8 0.7 0.5 0.2 1.6 0.6 3.9 1.5
2006 1.9 0.7 1.5 0.6 1.7 0.7 5.1 1.9
2007 2.1 0.8 2.8 1.1 2.0 0.8 7.0 2.6
2008 2.1 0.8 3.3 1.2 2.2 0.8 7.6 2.9
2009 2.1 0.8 2.6 1.0 2.4 0.9 7.1 2.7
Source: Local government units’ financial statements, 2010.
After 2001, local government debt significantly increased. Direct loans, which gra-
dually decreased, had the biggest share in LGU debt structure in 2003. The predominant 
role was from 2004 taken over by utility companies’ borrowings (approved by local go-
vernment units and backed by guarantees) and arrears that caused an increase in total LGU 
debt to 7.1 billion kuna in 2009. LGU arrears started to increase significantly. 
Although from 1997 to 2009 LGU debt increased from 0.2 to 2.7%, measured as a 
percentage of GDP, LGU debt in Croatia is still relatively low. Without contingent liabili-
ties and arrears, the average LGU debt in the observed period equals 0.4% of GDP. LGU 
debt in Croatia is low if compared with the debt of local government units from EU mem-
ber countries (see appendix). 
Payment arrears are an untransparent and undesirable source of financing that has 
wider implications for local economies and businesses. Government should not be 
encouraged to run up payment arrears and a case could be made for placing restrictions 
on the borrowing of local government via outstanding payment arrears, irrespective of 
the size of the debt. This would encourage local government to replace arrears with more 
transparent sources of funding and disincentivize the accumulation of new arrears by local 
government units with substantial capital investment programs that need to be funded by 
borrowing.397
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The size of the total local government debt (local government plus utility compani-
es) would be useful for indicating the total exposure of local government units – rather 
than the actual liabilities (shown in table 9). The size of utility companies’ debt could si-
gnificantly alter the perception of the level of local government indebtedness, especially 
as local units are using utility companies to hide their actual borrowing levels. Unfortu-
nately data on the size, structure and borrowing conditions of utility companies and their 
influence on the total level of total local government debt are not publicly available and 
represent subjects for further research.
5 Local government net-debt 
Net-debt is the difference between financial assets and financial liabilities. It is a 
very useful indicator of liquidity and the ability of local government to repay interest 
on and principal of an existing debt. Financial assets of local government unit consist of 
cash (currency), deposits, loans (given) and shares in institutions in or outside the public 
sector. Financial liabilities encompass all liabilities for issued financial instruments and 
loans (received). 
When observing financial assets it has to be pointed out that the majority of shares 
are probably not recorded at their market value, because the shares that local government 
units possess are not actively traded in the market. In contrast, financial liabilities are 
recorded according to their market value, because liabilities consist of loans and other 
contractual obligations with a precise market value. Therefore, it is essential to separate 
the net financial position of LGUs, with and without shares, from the shares possessed by 
local government units, in order to assess LGU borrowing capacity more precisely. 
The financial position of local government units measured as net financial assets, i.e. 
as a difference of liquid financial assets (currency, deposits, loans, securities) and liabi-
lities in 2007 and 2009 (table 10) was satisfactory. Local government units, in general, 
are not facing major liquidity problems. Existing liabilities are completely covered with 
cash available on accounts in commercial banks (if local government units liquidated all 
liabilities, they would still have 1.7 billion kuna in 2007 or 220 million kuna in 2009 of 
liquid financial assets on their accounts). It is obvious how the financial crisis has adver-
sely affected the financial health of local government units. Although in general it seems 
pretty liquid, even in 2009, if the local government sector is observed according to diffe-
rent levels of government, it can be concluded that cities were much more affected by the 
financial downturn than other local government levels. Taking everything into account, 
the financial position of LGUs is adequate, with an increase in the number of local gover-
nment units that fulfil the borrowing criteria up to the period of the financial crisis. This 
can be further proved by observing the Croatian National Bank’s data on the comparison 
of a part of LGUs’ financial assets (deposits denominated in kuna and other currencies) 
and financial liabilities (loans and bonds) in the period from 2003 to 2009. 
Comparing the monthly value of deposits and LGU liabilities, it turns out that local 
government units possess satisfactory excess liquidity, which can be used for repayment 
of incurred liabilities in almost the whole observed period. 398
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Table 10:   Financial position and liquidity of local government unit in 2007 and 2009 
(in million kuna)
 
Counties Municipalities Cities City of Zagreb Total
2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009
Financial 
assets
780 789 859 723 1,836 1,568 593 300 4,067 3,114
Currency 298 145 716 449 1,217 763 481 194 2,712 1,357
Deposits 98 285 78 223 366 592 60 65 602 1,101
Loans (given) 385 359 63 50 243 192 20 25 710 601
Domestic 409 389 63 50 244 194 20 25 736 634
Foreign 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Securities 0 0 1 1 10 21 32 16 43 22
Domestic 0 0 2 1 10 21 32 16 43 22
Foreign 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial 
liabilities
221 295 251 294 1,523 2,304 350 509 2,345 2,894
Securities 4 0 0 6 479 580 0 0 483 587
Domestic 4 0 0 6 479 580 0 0 483 587
Foreign 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loans 217 295 251 288 1,043 1,724 350 509 1,861 2,307
Domestic 217 295 251 287 971 1,712 350 509 1,790 2,294
Foreign 0 0 0 1 83 29 0 0 84 29
Net financial 
assets
559 494 608 429 313 -736 242 -209 1,723 220
Source: Local government units’ financial statements, 2010.
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Figure 7:   Local government units’ deposits and loans from commercial banks from 
1993 to 2010 (in billion kuna)399
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Until the end of the year 2000 financial liabilities of local government units were ra-
rely higher than financial assets, but from 2001 disposable financial assets of local go-
vernment units increased significantly. Deposits and currency on bank accounts by far 
outgrew total liabilities (by more than a billion kuna). Financial obligations for loans and 
bonds are insured with high quality financial assets. That is mainly a result of the incre-
ased funds for the decentralized functions that local government units received based on 
an increased share in personal income tax and an increase in grants from central bud-
get. Growth in financial assets (deposits) is especially apparent in the period from 2002 
to 2006, when central government, due to an increased share in personal income tax, pa-
ssed down higher amounts, which probably caused an increase in local government units’ 
funds in bank accounts. At the beginning of 2009 the level of financial assets decreased 
as a consequence of the financial crisis. 
Since a portion of increased financial assets is related to earmarked or mandatory 
expenditures from devolved functions such as health or education services, it can not be 
used for other purposes, such as debt service. Therefore, in order to get a picture on the 
true position of the local government units’ “free” cash flows available to service debt 
(financial health), the relationship between earmarked and non-earmarked revenue has to 
be identified (table 11). 
Table 11: Local government unit net revenue from 2002 to 2009 (in million kuna)
Year Total revenue
Grants from 
government 
budget
PIT and surtax revenue 
for 33 cities that took over 
decentralised functions
Total net revenue
2002 12,426 1,281 3,178   7,967
2003 14,488 1,202 3,535   9,751
2004 15,727 738 4,063 10,926
2005 17,397 880 4,164 12,354
2006 19,612 875 4,639 14,098
2007 23,166 1,571 6,924 14,671
2008 25,038 1,853 7,492 15,693
2009 23,318 1,701 7,496 14,121
Source: Local government units’ financial statements.
Since there is no publicly available information on local government units’ earmarked 
revenue, table 11 shows data on LGUs’ total revenue, total grants from general government 
budget (mainly earmarked), and revenue from personal income tax and surtax of 33 cities 
that took over decentralised functions. Since just a portion of personal income tax and 
surtax revenue of those 33 cities is earmarked, the value of net revenue is not completely 
accurate, but it can provide a good approximation of total disposable (non-earmarked) 
revenue. The share of earmarked in total revenue is relatively stable, ranging from 28 to 
39%. In other words, while total revenue from 2002 to 2009 increased by 87.65%, total 
net revenue increased by 77.24%. 400
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It is obvious (from table 12) that the 33 cities that took over decentralised functions 
have a dominant share in local government units’ aggregate financial data. Having that in 
mind, it is clear that aggregate data on local government units’ operations could provide a 
misleading picture of the financial state of individual local government units. Therefore, a 
further examination of some major groups of local government units’ operations follows 
in the remainder of this chapter. 
Table 12 represents the structure of local government current revenue, displaying a 
separate structure for A – cities, B – cities that took on decentralised functions, C – citi-
es that took on decentralised functions without city of Zagreb, D – cities that didn’t take 
on decentralised functions.
Table 12:   Structure of local government current revenue, in million kuna in 2009
ABCD
Taxes 14,256 8,238 3,368 1,547
Contribution/social 0 0 0 0
Grants 2,037 389 334 472
Property income 1,691 1,097 590 179
Administrative fees, user charges 4,292 2,808 1,569 689
Other revenue 161 85 78 27
Total current revenue 22,437 12,617 5,939 2,913
Current revenue as % of total
Taxes 64 65 57 53
Contribution/social 0 0 0 0
Grants 9 3 6 16
Property income 8 9 10 6
Administrative fees, user charges 19 22 26 24
Other revenue 1 1 1 1
Total current revenue 100 100 100 100
Note: (A) all cities, (B) cities that took on decentralised functions, (C) cities that took on decen-
tralised functions not including the city of Zagreb, (D) cities that didn’t take on decentralised functions.
Source: Ministry of Finance.
Total revenue of cities that took over decentralised function in 2009 represented 
more than 56% of total local government sector revenue (cumulative revenue of all local 
government units). In addition to that, 52% of the revenue of the 33 cities is accounted 
for by the revenue of the City of Zagreb. Similarly, the total expenditure of the 33 cities 
represented more than 56% of total local government sector expenditure (and with its share 
of almost 53%, City of Zagreb has the dominant role in 33 cities’ total expenditure).
Tax revenue dominated in the structure of aggregate LGU revenue. Financing of LGUs 
strongly relies on income tax revenue sharing. Tax revenue (mostly income tax) repre-
sents more than 65% of total current revenue for the 33 cities that took over decentrali-
sed functions. That is mainly a reflection of the revenue structure of the City of Zagreb, 401
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because if Zagreb is excluded from the sample, in the revenue structure of the remaining 
32 cities, taxes represented slightly less than 57%. Comparison of the share of tax in the 
total revenue of cities that took over decentralised functions and those that did not reveal 
the interesting information that the tax revenue share for cities that took over decentrali-
sed functions is 12 percentage points higher than for the rest of the cities.
Box 2: City of Zagreb and utility company borrowing and debt
At the end of 2008, the credit rating agency Moody’s Investor Services downgraded the 
credit rating of Zagrebacki Holding from Baa2 to Baa3 (from medium to lower solvency level) 
and the city of Zagreb from Baa1 to Baa2 (from higher to medium solvency level). The cre-
dit rating was downgraded because of the high borrowing activity of utility companies and the 
poor debt repayment conditions and overall financial position of Zagrebacki Holding. Despite 
the relatively low level of the City of Zagreb’s direct debt, its exposure to the financial opera-
tions of Zagrebacki Holding has significantly increased. This situation enhanced the need for 
the determination of local government units’ creditworthiness in Croatia, taking into account 
the total financial operations of local government units and their utility companies. 
Table 13:   City of Zagreb and Zagrebacki Holding debt from 2005 to 2009, in million kuna 
and as % of total
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
billion kuna
City of Zagreb 481 349 350 467 509
Zagrebacki Holding n.a. 1,371 4,197 4,960 5,040
Total debt   1,720 4,547 5,427 5,549
%
City of Zagreb   20 8 9 9
Zagrebacki Holding   80 92 91 91
Total  100 100 100 100
Source: City of Zagreb and Zagrebacki Holding financial statements, 2010.
From 2006 to 2009 total consolidated debt of the City of Zagreb increased from 1.7 bi-
llion to 5.5 billion kuna. The debt of the city budget is relatively low (around 9% of total con-
solidated debt), whereas the debt of Zagrebacki Holding is the major share of the consolida-
ted debt (more than 90%). 
The borrowing of Zagrebacki Holding has increased significantly since 2007, when the 
Holding issued corporate bonds amounting to approximately 2.7 billion kuna on the London 
Stock Exchange. Accordingly, the total debt of Zagrebacki Holding in 2009 reached around 
5 billion kuna.402
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Table 14:   Zagrebacki Holding debt covered by guarantees and subsidies from 2005 to 2009, 
in million kuna
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Zagrebacki Holding, total debt n.a. 1,371 4,197 4,960 5,040
City of Zagreb guarantees 806 1,142 1,363 1,520 1,239
Subsidies from the City of Zagreb budget to 
Zagrebacki Holding
561 612 670 870 951
Guarantees as % of total debt –  83 32 31 25
Subsidies as % of total debt –  45 16 18 19
Source: Authors’ calculation based on financial statements of City of Zagreb and Zagrebacki Holding.
Almost 25% of the Zagrebacki Holding debt is covered by City of Zagreb’s guarantees. 
Additionally, Zagrebacki Holding obtains subsidies from city budget (amounting 19% of total 
debt only in 2009). 
The status of the unguaranteed portion of the Zagrebacki Holding debt is an implicit gu-
arantee from the City of Zagreb that makes the contingent liabilities of Zagreb much more si-
gnificant that the actual liability position. Unfortunately, data on utility companies’ debt are 
available only for the City of Zagreb. 
The City of Zagreb as owner should exercise (particularly because it is a public owner) 
considerable supervision over how the company is operated, should ensure that the governan-
ce arrangements are appropriate, set the overall financial policy, supervise borrowing and in-
deed set limits and key financial parameters. The accounts of city (municipal) companies sho-
uld be consolidated with those of the city/municipality as they should be if either the cash or 
the accrual international Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) are applied. This would 
then show the overall financial position of the city/municipality and in turn ought to encoura-
ge the Council to take more interest in the companies it controls.
Unfortunately, in present budget legislation there is no formal consolidation requirement, 
which is the result of the lack of definition in the status of extrabudgetary users. The local uti-
lity companies are not even required to consolidate their budgetary financial statements, be-
cause they are legal entities that operate according to the law that regulates corporations. This 
is the reason why we argue that local government units should consolidate the financial sta-
tements of utility (or other) enterprises with the budget (or financial statements) of local go-
vernment units. In the present circumstances we cannot see the real level of LGU consumpti-
on and investment in capital and current expenditure and can hardly get an impression about 
gross or net LGU debt and the LGU borrowing requirement.
6 Creditworthiness and credit rating of local government unit
Why do we need to analyse the creditworthiness of local government units? The dif-
ferent statuses of local government units in a certain state, variations in fiscal capacities, 
numbers of inhabitants, unclear rules for tax revenue sharing and many other facts unco-
ver huge differences in the financial stability of certain local government units. Consequ-
ently, the credit ratings of local government units can vary significantly. 403
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Rating local government units through a credit rating system can detect failures or 
omissions in managing certain segments of their operations. If factors that adversely in-
fluence credit rating could be detected, officials managing local government units could 
focus on improvements in a certain segment of operations in order to improve credit ra-
ting. A publicly available local government unit credit rating could serve as a direct way 
of promoting the best local government and warning those that underperform, motivating 
them for improvement. In that way, it would be possible to enhance positive competiti-
veness between local government units, which could increase the efficiency of the com-
plete local government sector. 
Budgetary constraints, credit rating and credit risk. Budgetary constraints for local 
government units’ borrowing to a certain extent motivate local government units to use 
their financial resources more efficiently. Nevertheless, omitting budgetary restrictions and 
criteria for local government borrowing that are not so demanding (if operating revenue 
was higher than operating expenditure in a year before the year of borrowing) enables even 
not very successful local government units to take on debt as well. It has to be pointed out 
that borrowing legislation creates quite a big disparity between individual and cumulative 
borrowing constraints. If an efficient control of meeting the borrowing requirements were 
in place the need for the development of a credit rating system would still exist in order to 
determine the priority for the approval of local government units’ borrowing. One of the 
ways for creating a ranking for local government units could be a credit rating system. 
A system that grades internal and external factors from local government units’ 
surroundings could provide a bunch of external indicators that would help identify potential 
failures or limiting factors set by legislation. In that way, potential institutional constraints 
could be identified and removed or at least restrained, very soon further enhancing the 
development and efficiency of the local government sector. All those facts additionally 
support the idea of a transparent and thorough credit rating system for local government 
units in Croatia. 
Even though local government units’ operations represent an essential credit rating 
indicator, utility companies’ operations under the control of or owned by local government 
units have to be considered with special attention. Due to the fact that utility companies’ 
debt is not considered a part of local government units’ debt, local government units 
avoid budgetary constraints on borrowing by raising loans through their utility companies. 
Therefore, potential risks associated with utility companies’ operations can represent a 
key component of a local government units’ credit risk, which has to be analysed and 
interpreted with due caution. 
7 Conclusion
Sources of potential financial instability and risks to the creditworthiness of local 
government units can be found in the financial operations of utility companies. 
Unfortunately, the financial operations of utility companies have hitherto not been 
consolidated in one place. Local government units interact with utility companies accor-
ding to the principle of connected vessels because funds from the government budget 404
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are often transfused through subsidies or grants but also through the issuing of guaran-
tees for utility companies’ borrowing. And ultimately, it is by virtue of utility companies 
that local government units perform the biggest part of their financial and capital inves-
tments. Local government units’ budgets and utility companies’ budgets formally do not 
operate according to the principle of connected vessels. The city mayor proposes and the 
assembly adopts the budget, but the assembly does not adopt the financial plans of the 
utility companies. 
Through capital market liberalization, but also because of growing demands for local 
government unit borrowing in Croatia, the problem of determining LGU creditworthine-
ss is going to become more significant for potential investors, for local government units, 
and also for regulatory and supervisory authorities at the central government level. 
Recommendations
In order to acquire a thorough image of the assets involved, the financial operations of 
local government units and especially the size of their debts created through utility com-
panies, the financial statements of utility companies and local government units have to 
be consolidated. Formally, that should not be a problem because utility companies are 
owned by local units. But since utility companies have the status of public corporations, 
this has not been possible so far. 
The Government and the Ministry of Finance should regulate borrowing (purpose, in-
struments, security, issuance of guarantees, etc.) of central government, local government 
units and utility companies, in one Public Debt Act. 
The Government and the Ministry of Finance should empower a system of financial 
controls in order to prevent wilful violation of the Budget Act’s provisions and local 
government borrowing without prior approval. 
They should introduce analysis of creditworthiness through a credit rating system 
for local government units. Inaugurating a credit rating system would improve control 
of adherence to budgetary constraints and determination of priorities for approving local 
government units’ borrowing.405
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APPENDIX
Local government debt in European countries, as % of GDP 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
EU-27 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.1 5.1 5.7
EU-25 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.7
EU-15 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.4 5.9
EA-16* 5.4 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.6 6.0
EA-15 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.5 5.6 6.0
EA-13 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.5 5.6 6.1
EA-12 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.6 6.1
Belgium 5.2 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.0 4.8 4.8
Bulgaria 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.0
Czech Republic 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.7
Denmark 4.8 5.0 5.3 5.5 5.9 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.3 7.2
Germany 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.3 4.9 4.8 5.1
Estonia 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.7 3.2 4.0
Ireland 1.7 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.4
Greece 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8
Spain 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.3
France 7.4 7.1 6.8 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.3 7.6 8.2
Italy 5.6 5.7 6.2 6.4 6.8 7.5 8.1 7.9 8.1 8.5
Cyprus 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0
Latvia 1.4 1.5 1.6 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.3 4.1 5.6
Lithuania 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.6
Luxembourg 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.3
Hungary 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.4 3.1 3.9 4.1
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Netherlands 9.1 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.0 8.0 7.5 7.1 7.2 7.9
Austria 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.0
Poland 1.1 1.3 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.3 3.0
Portugal 2.4 2.7 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.8 4.3
Romania 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.2 1.2 1.7 1.8 2.3
Slovenia 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.5
Slovakia 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.5
Finland 4.0 3.8 3.9 4.4 4.8 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.4 6.6
Sweden 5.3 5.2 6.0 6.2 5.6 5.8 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.8
UK 5.5 5.2 4.9 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.8
Norway 8.0 8.9 9.1 9.6 10.0 9.6 9.4 9.6 9.5 11.3
Croatia 1 1.5 1.9 2.6 2.9 2.7
Croatia 2 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8
Note 1: Croatian local government debt consist of direct and potential LGU liabilities and arre-
ars since 2005. 
Note 2: Croatian local government direct debt (loans and bonds).
Source: Eurostat, 2010. For Croatia: Ministry of finance of the Republic of Croatia.
*EA – Euro area406
A. Bajo and M. Primorac: Local government borrowing practice in Croatia
Financial Theory and Practice 34 (4) 379-406 (2010)
LITERATURE
Bajo, A. and Filipović, B., 2008. “The Efficiency of the Water Supply in Croatia”. 
Newsletter, No. 37. Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance.
Bajo, A. and Primorac, M., 2009. “Zašto je lokalnim jedinicama potreban kreditni 
rejting”. Zbornik s III konferencije Hrvatski javni sektor u aktualnim gospodarskim uvje-
tima, Hrvatska zajednica računovođa i financijskih djelatnika, Opatija, April 2 i 3, 2009. 
Bajo, A., 1998. “Financiranje lokalnih jedinica zaduživanjem”. Financijska praksa, 
22 (4-5), 469-490.
Bajo, A., 2004. “Local Government Unit Borrowing in Croatia: Opportunities and 
Constraints”. Financial Theory and Practice, 28 (2), 203-217.
Bajo, A., 2007. “Do Utility Companies Increase Local Government Debt in Croatia?” 
Newsletter, No. 28. Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance.
Bajo, A., 2008. “Why has the Credit Rating of Zagrebacki Holding Been Downgra-
ded?”, Press Release, No. 5. Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance.
International Federation of Accountants, 2007. International Public Sector 
Accounting Standards. New York: International Federation of Accountants.
Naputak o postupku zaduživanja i davanja jamstva jedinica lokalne i područne 
(regionale) samouprave, NN 32/2002. Zagreb: Narodne novine.
Petersen, J. and Crihfield, J. B., 2000. Linkages Between Local Governments and 
Financial Markets: A Tool Kit to Developing Sub-Sovereign Credit Markets in Emerging 
Economies. Washington: The World Bank.
Peterson, E. G., 1998. Measuring Local Government Credit Risk and Improving Cre-
ditworthiness. Washington: The World Bank.
Peterson, E. G., 2000. Building Local Credit Systems. Washington: The World 
Bank.
Pravilnik o postupku zaduživanja jedinica lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave 
i davanju jamstva jedinica područne (regionalne) samouprave, NN 55/2004, 58/2009. 
Zagreb: Narodne novine.
Zakon o proračunu, NN 87/08. Zagreb: Narodne novine. 
** The Budget execution laws from 2003 to 2009 (Official Gazette).